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Dale A. Oesterle*

Should Courts Do Behavioral Analysis of
Boardroom Conduct?

On August 27, 2012, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed Chancellor Leo
Strine’s stunning trial court decision in the Southern Peru Copper case1
through its opinion in Americas Mining Corp. v. Theriault.2 Theriault involved an
overly generous deal price in an acquisition with a single controlling shareholder in
charge of both parties.3 The defendants, a purchasing company and its affiliated
directors, were liable to their shareholders for a whopping $1.347 billion.4
The plaintiff’s attorneys were awarded an equally eye popping $285 million in
fees.5 The inside directors were included among those liable.6 The outside,
independent directors, including those on the Special Negotiating Committee were
not; they had been dropped out on an earlier summary judgment motion.7
The case was a typical application of the “entire fairness” standard.8 One
shareholder, Grupo Mexico, owned 55% of the buyer, Southern Peru, and 99% of
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1. In re S. Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011).
2. 51 A.3d 1213 (Del. 2012).
3. Id. at 1219.
4. Id. at 1250.
5. Id. at 1262–63. The award was the approximate hourly rate for plaintiff’s counsel of $35,000 an hour
for 8,597 hours of work. See id. at 1252, 1257. There have been only three higher total fee awards—for the
attorneys in Enron ($688 million), Tyco ($492 million) and World Com ($335 million). See Joe Palazzolo, How
Much is $300 Million in Attorneys’ Fees?, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Dec. 28, 2011, 12:21 PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/12/28/how-much-is-300-million-in-attorneys-fees/ (“Only plaintiffs’ attorneys’
fees in class actions against Enron ($688 million), Tyco ($492 million), and WorldCom ($336 million) were
larger.”).
6. Theriault, 51 A.3d at 1235. The court dismissed a claim for rescissory damages on the grounds of delay
(laches) and enforced the judgment by ordering the controlling shareholder to remit the buyer company’s
shares. Id. at 1249–50.
7. Id. at 1235. The holding is based on a 102(b)(7) liability waiver in the certificate of incorporation. The
poor conduct of the Special Committee was the basis of the case, however. The Special Committee’s conduct
led the trial court to refuse to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff’s under the Lynch case. Id. at 1242.
8. See, e.g., Jennifer Johnson, What’s Good for the Goose? A Critical Essay on “Best Practices” for Private
Firms, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 251, 258 (2007) (explaining that the “entire fairness test” queries whether the
defendant carried its burden of demonstrating that the transaction was fair to the corporation).
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the seller, Minera Mexico.9 Grupo wanted Southern Peru to purchase Minera using
Southern Peru stock as consideration.10 Since an excessive price for Minera
obviously benefits Grupo at the expense of the minority shareholders of Southern
Peru, Southern Peru knew at least one minority shareholder would bring a
derivative action to ask a Delaware court to revisit the fairness of the price.
To protect itself from judicial oversight, Southern Peru, following a now
customary practice, formed a special committee of outside directors, all able
professionals, and the committee hired top-flight legal and financial advisors.11 The
financial advisor, Goldman Sachs, threw a wrench in the gears of the deal early on
when it opined that Minera was worth only around 60% of the pending offering
price ($3.15 billion in Southern Peru shares).12 The Special Committee asked
Goldman to go back to the drawing board to see if they could “make the deal
happen.”13
Goldman did what it was asked to do, primarily by revaluing the Southern Peru
stock being used as consideration for Minera.14 Goldman found that Southern
Peru’s stock was not worth its then-current trading price.15 Add a minor concession
in the number of buyer shares used as consideration, some finesse in the valuing of
Minera, and two shareholder voting agreements between the controlling
shareholder and two large minority shareholders of Southern Peru and the deal
closed at a tad under the original bid with the assent of the Special Committee (with
a conflicted Committee director abstaining at the last minute).16
Chancellor Strine did not buy Goldman Sach’s revaluation and his math on the
amount of liability was simple: the bid price ($3.7 billion plus) minus the value of
the seller, drawing heavily on the original Goldman Sachs valuation of the seller
($2.4 billion or so), equals a judgment of $1.34 billion in damages.17 The Court
ordered the controlling shareholder, Grupo Mexico, to return to the buyer shares
equal to the award and to pay attorney’s fees out of the award equal to 15% of the
amount.18

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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There is much to say about this case. One could chew on the Special Committee
authorization resolution,19 the summary judgment for the independent directors,
the problematic shareholder agreements,20 the compensation of plaintiff’s
attorneys,21 the refusal to redress the fiasco that is the Lynch case,22 or the corporate
governance provisions that “topped up” the value of the seller.23 Of these, the most
notable is the incongruity of the purported legal innocence of the members of the
Special Committee, given that the Committee’s actions were deplorable and
subjected the company and the other directors, including those not on the
Committee and whose acts were not in issue, to massive liability.
However, I am intrigued by something else Vice Chancellor Travis Laster’s
speech in justification of the holding before the Society of Corporate Secretaries &
Governance Professionals National Conference in July of 2012.24 Vice Chancellor
Laster struggled with how a Special Committee composed of “experience,
competent and . . . [with the exception of the abstaining conflicted director] clearly
independent directors” retaining “top-tier advisors” could “[blow] it.”25 His
answer? The board was captured by “cognitive biases.”26
Vice Chancellor Laster gave a thoughtful discussion of four cognitive biases
evident in the Special Committee’s decision-making: anchoring (estimates based on
a known starting value), framing (the effect of framing alternatives as gains rather
than losses, for example), confirmation (seeking out information that validates

19. The Special Committee did not have the absolute authority to approve the deal. Id. at 1221–22.
20. The Special Committee dropped the majority-of-minority vote demand and agreed to approval of twothirds of the outstanding common stock. The controlling shareholder needed only the votes of two large block
minority shareholders to reach the two thirds threshold. Both large minority shareholders signed side contracts
with the controlling shareholder to exchange registration rights (liquidity) for their support on the merger vote.
Id. at 1228.
21. It was excessive. Id. at 1252.
22. The Supreme Court struggled with the mechanics of a “shifting” burden of proof that only shifts at the
conclusion of the presentation of the evidence at trial. Id. at 1241–42. Moreover, many commentators,
including this one, and indeed Delaware Vice Chancellors, view the Lynch precedent as a mistake. A valid
Special Negotiating Committee procedure should apply a business judgment rule analysis to the Committee not
an entire fairness review with a shift in the burden of proof from the defendants to the plaintiffs.
23. Id. at 1228.
24. Travis Laster, Del. Vice Chancellor, Cognitive Bias in Director Decision-Making, Address Before the
Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals National Conference (July 2012), in 20
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ADVISOR, Nov./Dec. 2012, at 1–9.
25. Id. at 4.
26. Id. A cognitive bias is a pattern of judgments in which illogical behavior prevails over rational
behavior. Jim Taylor, Cognitive Biases v.s. [sic] Common Sense, PSYCHOL. TODAY (July 18, 2011),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-power-prime/201107/cognitive-biases-vs-common-sense. Cognitive
biases lead to inaccurate judgments and other types of irrational behavior. Id. The study of cognitive bias is
often associated with the path-breaking work of Professors Kahneman and Tversky. See, e.g., Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 J. SCI. 1124 (1974). Professor
Kahneman was awarded the 2002 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics for his work. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002, NOBEL MEDIA, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economic-sciences/laureates/2002/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2013).
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existing views), and groupthink (the desire to promote harmony and avoid
dissent).27 Of the four, he is most critical of the board’s groupthink problems.28
He could have added another form of bias, equally important and supplemental
to the groupthink bias, namely that of misplaced loyalty to authority. Path-breaking
work in empirical social psychology by Professor Stanley Milgram in the late
1960s,29 reinforced by decades of studies, has shown that loyalty is hardwired in
human behavior and loyalty to an authority figure can easily suppress even the
strongest ethical standards (misplaced loyalty).30
Misplaced loyalty to an authority figure is a recurring theme in many disastrous
business decisions. 31 Corporate officers and directors, who should have known
better, put loyalty to a dynamic leader (i.e. the CEO or controlling shareholder)
above duty to shareholders and even, occasionally, obedience to the law. The
officers and directors of Enron and Worldcom who were not active in the basic
financial frauds but passively approved them easily come to mind.32
Groupthink, combined with blindly bowing to authority, is a potent and vile
brew for all directors, inside and out, who passively follow the lead of a controlling
CEO.

27. Laster, supra note 24, at 4–6. Scholarship over the last forty years in cognitive science, social psychology
and behavioral economics has created an evolving list of cognitive biases. See generally JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1982) (illustrating numerous types of cognitive biases).
28. “Groupthink is the most important bias for boards of directors to watch for.” Laster, supra note 24, at
5.
29. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974). Professor Milgram’s study has just recently
come under scathing attack by Professor Gina Perry. GINA PERRY, BEHIND THE SHOCK MACHINE: THE UNTOLD
STORY OF THE NOTORIOUS MILGRAM PSYCHOLOGY EXPERIMENTS 1 (2012). Among other things, she attacks the
effect of his experiment on his human subjects, his secret experiments, and his published data. Carol Tavris, The
Experiments that Still Shock, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2013, at C5.A common review of her book notes that other
professionals have replicated Milgram’s results multiple times and in a variety of world-wide settings. Id.
30. See, e.g., Piero Bocchiaro & Phillip G. Zimbardo, Defying Unjust Authority: An Exploratory Study, 29
CURRENT PSYCHOL. 155, 166 (2010); Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64
AM. PSYCHOL. 1, 9 (2009); Jan De Vos, Now That You Know, How Do You Feel? The Milgram Experiment and
Psychologization, 7 ANN. REV. CRITICAL PSYCHOL. 223, 246 (2009). The famous Milgram experiment conducted
in 1962 illustrates the phenomena. An experimenter was able to demand subjects to deliver a series of
increasing electric shocks to a “student,” played by an actor. In reality there were no shocks, but the actor played
the part, reacting more negatively as subjects delivered, on order, higher levels of current for student “mistakes.”
Sixty-five percent of the subjects delivered the highest level of current (a massive pretend 450 volt shock) even
with the student banging on the wall and complaining about a heart condition. The original Simulated Shock
Generator, or shock box, is located in the Archives of the History of American Psychology. Dan Hurley, Bizarre
and Infamous Join Scholarship in an Archive of Psychology, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at F3.
31. See, e.g., Randall Morck, Behavioral Finance in Corporate Governance: Economics and Ethics of the Devil’s
Advocate, 12 J. MGMT. & GOV. 179, 196 (2008).
32. See Jim Hopkins, Report: WorldCom Board Passive, USA TODAY (June 8, 2003, 11:04 PM),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/telecom/2003-06-09-board_x.htm; William Neikirk, Enron
Board Called Passive, Deferential, CHIC. TRIB. (May 8, 2002), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2002-0508/business/0205080270_1_enron-board-board-members-finance.
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A number of writers in different professions have suggested that decision making
groups need procedural safeguards against groupthink and/or misplaced loyalty.33
Inevitably most of the writers tentatively propose, among other things, a devil’s
advocate procedure. This suggestion is found frequently in papers discussing
particularly the decision-making of corporate boards of directors.34 Vice Chancellor
Laster’s speech is yet another example.35
Some of the writers suggest that the “independent” director requirements for
modern publicly-traded company boards or that pressure for “diversity” on boards
are but a diluted form of this devil’s advocate procedure.36 We expect (or hope?)
independent (or “diverse”) directors will act as devil’s advocates in important
corporate matters.
A “devil’s advocate” is someone assigned to take a position opposite the
prevailing view to stimulate argument.37 Of the myriad solutions to misplaced
loyalty, the devil’s advocate procedure is the most crystalline: it is straightforward to
implement and easy to spot. Many of the other solutions are “softer,” mushy
intentions that are closer to aspirational goals than hard-cut processes.38 There are
also variations: a devil’s advocate can be a permanent position in the group,
assigned by issue or topic, or fixed by position in the discussion.39
33. See, e.g., David I. Levine, The Wheels of Washington: Groupthink and Iraq, S. F. CHRON. (Feb. 5, 2004,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/openforum/article/The-Wheels-of-Washington-Groupthink-andIraq-2825247.php; Johnny Kilhefner, Groupthink Examples in Business, HOUS. CHRON.,
http://work.chron.com/groupthink-examples-business-21692.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2013); Geneva
Weiglein, The Surgical Safety Checklist, 4 ROYAL C. OF SURGEONS IN IR. STUDENT MED. J. 67, 67–69 (2011).
34. See, e.g., Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 217 (2005);
Morck, supra note 31, at 194; Troy Paredes, Too Much Pay, Too Much Deference: Is CEO Overconfidence the
Product of Corporate Governance? 8 (Wash. U. Sch. of Law Faculty Working Paper Series, Paper No. 04-08-0,
2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=587162&download=yes.
35. Laster, supra note 24, at 6.
36. See Eleanor Bloxham, A Hint of Hope at HP, CNN MONEY (Nov. 18, 2011, 11:48 AM),
http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2011/11/18/a-hint-of-hope-at-hp/; David Margulies, Communications
Expert David Margulies Says Devil’s Advocate Could Have Prevented Komen PR Problems, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 7,
2012), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/communications-expert-david-margulies-says-devilsadvocate-could-have-prevented-komen-pr-problems-138889649.html.
37. Devil’s Advocate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/devil’s%20
advocate (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). The term originally arose from the canonization process of the Catholic
Church, in which a canon lawyer, holding an office called the “Promoter of the Faith” or “Devil’s advocate,”
was tasked with taking a skeptical view of any case being made for the sainthood of any individual. Erica
Bonnell, Playing the Devil’s Advocate, WASH. TIMES COMMUNITIES (Mar. 25, 2011), http://communities.
washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/holy-soap-opera/2011/mar/27/playing-devils-advocate. His counterpart
was “God’s Advocate,” who task was to make the argument for canonization. Id. In 1983, Pope John Paul II
abolished the practice, which had been ongoing since 1587. George Wiegel, John Paul II’s Saints – And Us,
CATHOLIC EDUC. RES. CTR. (2005), http://catholiceducation.org/articles/religion/re0803.html.
38. Examples include recommendations to “examin[e] . . . the accessible components of decision making”
and so on. Thomas H. Davenport, Make Better Decisions, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2009, at 117, 118.
39. Vice Chancellor Laster recommends appointing a designated devil’s advocate and having the
appointment rotate. Laster, supra note 24, at 6. In the movie World War Z, the Mossad is reputed to make the
tenth person who speaks on any issue a devil’s advocate. WORLD WAR Z (Plan B Entertainment 2013).
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This argument for a devil’s advocate bears a very close look. Should boards
implement a devil’s advocate procedure to help them satisfy an “entire fairness”
review? Or even a business judgment (gross negligence) review? Unfortunately,
empirical research does not cooperate. Studies show that a devil’s advocate is only
marginally effective in combating the problem of groupthink.40 By far the preferred
alternative is to have a real, rather than a pretend, dissenter on the board to
promote creative problem-solving. So we are back to what we all intuitively know
in the first place: you need a “shit on the board” (SOB), someone who asks the
tough questions of the CEO. Again, Vice Chancellor Laster agrees.Unfortunately,
this is hazardous duty as research shows.41 Dissenting directors are not rewarded
with career boosts; they often lose their board seats and when they do, they do not
get rewarded with new board seats elsewhere.42 So as we often say, and I am
paraphrasing: “Dissent must be its own reward.”
Or must it?
There are certain, special CEOs who nurture dissent on their boards. They are
easy to spot. Consider the column of Lucy Kellaway in the Financial Times. On a
airplane, she sat next to a woman who chairs several companies and who declared
“I always make sure that there is one shit on each of my boards.”43 Ms. Kellaway
continues:
The ego has no place on any board, as he is only interested in
himself. . . . The argument for Shits on Boards (SOBs) is quite different. An
SOB is someone who couldn’t care less what others think of him or her, and
is therefore low-maintenance, whereas an ego demands endless admiration
and attention. An SOB doesn’t mind upsetting people, cares nothing for
bonding and rather enjoys stirring things up. . . . [T]he SOB serves many
functions. They dash in on the attack . . . . Their attack leaves the way open
for the nicer, more constructive, board members to come in after
them. . . . [They] prevent[] things from getting too cosy round the table,
and [it is] harmless for others to gang up against [them]. Indeed, the proSOB arguments are so persuasive that there ought to be quotas to ensure
every company has a beast in the boardroom. According to my new friend,

40. NOAH J. GOLDSTEIN, STEVE J. MARTIN & ROBERT B. CIALDINI, YES!: 50 SCIENTIFICALLY PROVEN WAYS TO
BE PERSUASIVE 104 (2009).
41. Cassandra D. Marshall, Are Dissenting Directors Rewarded? 20 (Aug. 28, 2010) (unpublished working
paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1668642&download=yes.
42. See Juan Ma & Tarun Khanna, Independent Directors’ Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed
Companies in China 28 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper 13-089, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2252200 (finding that “dissenters are less likely to continue receiving board seats”).
43. Lucy Kellaway, Everyone Benefits From a Beast in the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 9. 2011, 4:16 PM),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3bdb9b68-f0cb-11e0-aec8-00144feab49a.html.
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the ideal number of SOBs around the table is one . . . as more than that
means too many clashes.44
Her short piece is worth reading in full as are the online comments. Some
commentators make the obvious point that the SOB cannot be the CEO or the
Chair, for example.45 Others remind us that a feuding, squabbling board is a
disaster.46 A board does have serious work to do and a perpetual grump on the
board can delay and obscure, drive deals outside the board meeting, and, in extreme
cases, engender outright hostility and deadlock.
It is evident that (1) there is a “sweet spot” in terms of degree of board dissent;
and more importantly, (2) an overly collegial board subject to groupthink and
misguided loyalty is a far more normal state of affairs and a far bigger risk than the
occasional dysfunctional, squabbling board. I suggest that many CEO’s, reading the
extensive literature on cooperation (niceness), have it backwards; they should take
care to nurture dissent not collegiality. Collegiality and obedience to authority
come easy to boards. Disagreement comes hard and the CEO must encourage and
support it.
Unfortunately the tricks of structured role playing that are the stock in trade of
class room psychologists are probably of limited usefulness. In the end, the
openness to dissent ought not to take the form of artificial devil’s advocate
procedures, nor the form of appointing dyed in the wool grumps or cynics. It
should consist of an atmosphere or culture in which capable, thoughtful people are
encouraged to speak their mind whenever they disagree with or are otherwise
hesitant to follow the CEO’s recommended course of action, in which those same
people are thanked rather than penalized for their candor, and in which people who
do not actively participate in adding serious thought to a discussion on difficult
decisions are not welcome on the board.
Small groups that operate with a healthy respect for dissent are not hard to spot.
A moment’s observation by a savvy, experienced outsider can distinguish, for
example, a law faculty that defers passively to the dean’s recommendations from
one that respects a dean’s request but deliberates thoughtfully on its consequences.
I have no doubt that boards of directors could be similarly judged.
In any event, could judges take evidence on board dynamics in their analysis of
board decisions? If a judge can spot the biases, surely experts could testify on board
procedure as well. This suggestion would no doubt cause Vice Chancellor Laster to
recoil in horror: “I am not advocating that!” He was merely explaining how a good

44. Id.
45. E.g., Franjo, Comment to Everyone Benefits From a Beast in the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011,
7:55 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3bdb9b68-f0cb-11e0-aec8-00144feab49a.html.
46. E.g., Claudius, Comment to Everyone Benefits From a Beast in the Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011,
5:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3bdb9b68-f0cb-11e0-aec8-00144feab49a.html.
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committee with top-flight advisors could and did err.47 As he would likely
recognize, opening the door to judicial analysis of board dynamics would
significantly encumber fact finding in what are already very complicated cases.
But consider the logical extension of his remarks. A breach of fiduciary duty
analysis could include an analysis of whether the CEO has put in place an overly
compliant board or nurtured a board whose members are welcome to disagree and
dissent.48 A judge could decide that a new wrinkle on fiduciary duty is for those at
the top to encourage healthy dissent. The Vice Chancellor applied the analysis in an
“entire fairness” test49 and, by extension, could logically support the same analysis,
although with a higher substantive standard of misbehavior for liability, in a
standard business judgment rule situation. Is it gross negligence for a CEO to, at
some level of extremism, brow-beat a board into submission rather than encourage
board members to voice their disagreements?

47. See Laster, supra note 24, at 4.
48. This would be analogous to the so called “Caremark duty” of a board to put in place adequate systems
of information reporting and internal controls, systems that enable a board to oversee and monitor a firm’s
operations. See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 139 (Del. 2008).
49. Id. at 7; see also Johnson, supra note 8, at 258 (explaining the “entire fairness” test).
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